{"id":2816,"date":"2019-09-09T16:09:55","date_gmt":"2019-09-09T16:09:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/?p=2816"},"modified":"2022-06-17T16:57:57","modified_gmt":"2022-06-17T16:57:57","slug":"radical-right-moderate","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/?p=2816","title":{"rendered":"The rise of the \u201csexually modern nativists\u201d in the far right"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Imagine, for a second, a radical right\nvoter; someone, perhaps from UKIP or AfD, or even the National Rally (formerly\nNational Front). The image coming to mind is likely a middle aged, or older,\nworking class man, with strong conservative attitudes on a variety of issues,\nfrom immigration and the European Union, to women\u2019s rights and the environment.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This image is fairly accurate, yet only tells part of the story. If I draw a radical right voter at random, there\u2019s only about a 25 per cent chance he, or she, would conform to this expectation. Many, surprisingly, actually have somewhat liberal positions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

My recent journal article<\/a> examines the attitudinal and demographic breakdown of the West European radical right from 2004 to 2016, with the European Social Survey<\/a>, a biennial survey of European public opinion. Using a statistical technique that places individuals into groups based on similar survey responses and demographic characteristics, I find three broad types of radical right voters \u2013 conservative, moderate, and sexually-modern nativists. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cconservative nativists\u201d, as I alluded\nto above, comprise about a quarter of my sample. These individuals are older,\nless educated, and are more likely to be men. They prefer traditional family\nstructures and strong government, and are highly opposed to immigration and\nEuropean integration. This is the typical \u201cradical right voter\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the opposite end of the spectrum are the\n\u201csexually-modern\nnativists<\/a>\u201d. About a third fall into this group. As indicated by the\n\u201cnativist\u201d label, these voters are only slightly less nationalist than the\nconservatives. However, in other regards, they look like leftists \u2013 they\u2019re\nyounger, highly educated, more likely to be women, and are not opposed to\ngender egalitarianism and LGBT rights. The third group falls in between these\ntwo extremes, taking more moderate positions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Increase in \u2018sexually modern\u2019 nativists <\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The most striking result from my analyses\nconcerns the extent to which the \u201csexually-modern\u201d group in Europe has\nincreased in prevalence overtime. In 2004, the vast majority of the radical\nright is either moderate or conservative; only 12 per cent are sexually-modern.\nHowever, in 2016, almost half \u2013 45 per cent \u2013 fall into this category. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indeed, there is variation across the 10\ncountries in my study; Austria and Switzerland have more conservative radical\nright voters, while other countries, like the Netherlands and Sweden, are less\nconservative, but the general trend remains. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Yet why do we observe less conservatism\namong today\u2019s radical right? From Germany and France to Sweden and Denmark,\nradical right parties now discuss women\u2019s and LGBT rights as fundamental to\nEurope\u2019s identity \u2013  and I argue that\nparty rhetoric and the shock of the Syrian refugee crisis are key factors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This \u201cliberal nationalist\u201d rhetoric was\npopularized in the Netherlands in the early 2000s by the late Pim Fortuyn, an\nopenly gay sociology professor who founded a radical right party just months\nbefore the 2002 Dutch general election. Fortuyn provided a decidedly different\nrationale for restricting Muslim immigration. It was not that immigration\ncaused job loss or terrorism, as other radical right leaders have claimed.\nRather, he considered Islamic culture to be \u201cbackwards\u201d, an existential threat\nto the rights of women and the LGBT community. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This new framing of the immigration issue\nspread and paved the way for the populist resurgence of the mid-2010s. Spurred\nby the Syrian refugee crisis, immigration became an issue of unprecedented\nurgency and concern for European publics. And the radical right, long\nconsidered the most authoritative party family on this issue, was standing by\nto benefit. \u201cLiberal nationalist\u201d rhetoric made the radical right seem more\naccessible and less taboo to new voters who, in the past, may have never\nconsidered such an extreme option. Yet with refugees arriving on the shores of\nEurope in shocking numbers, and a European Union unsure of solutions, many\nvoters, perhaps, saw no other alternative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No longer can we dismiss the radical right\nas the party family of angry old men, reacting against a changing society. Now,\nwomen<\/a>\nand gay\nmen<\/a> are likely to be found within their ranks, alongside voters who, if not\nfor their immigration attitudes, might be confused for leftists. With support\nfor populists at an all-time\nhigh<\/a>, it is crucial that we understand who exactly these parties attract,\nand why.  <\/p>\n<\/span>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Imagine, for a second, a radical right voter; someone, perhaps from UKIP or AfD, or even the National Rally (formerly National Front). The image coming to mind is likely a middle aged, or older, working class man, with strong conservative attitudes on a variety of issues, from immigration and the European Union, to women\u2019s rights […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":169,"featured_media":2820,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[1395,1417],"tags":[1513],"coauthors":[1648],"class_list":["post-2816","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-comment","category-europe","tag-immigration"],"amp_enabled":true,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/09\/cropped-ben-eaton-L_kaTYIuu1o-unsplash.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2816","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/169"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2816"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2816\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/2820"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2816"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2816"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2816"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/politicalquarterlyblog.preliveweb.site\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcoauthors&post=2816"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}